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1. Introduction 
 
Human capital theory defines education as an investment in someone’s own 
capacity, his human capital exactly. This theory supposes that individuals 
choose rationally the most attractive alternative among different educational 
levels and types, given their needs and preferences. Rational investment 
postulates informed agents and investment in human capital makes no 
exception. Neither should the theory of human capital ignore risk, a feature so 
prominent in investment theory. 
 
Unfortunately little is known in the literature on the information quality of 
this particular category of investors – students – at the time of choice. 
Hereafter, we will provide some empirical evidence on the level and extent of 
knowledge that Dutch high school students possess at the time immediately 
preceding the most relevant education decision: proceeding or not to tertiary 
education. We will also assess if they are aware of the risky nature of such an 
investment and if, and to which amount, they require a compensation for it. 
We will further extend our analysis to check whether students possess private 
information that they exploit when forming their expectations and which 
factors influence their probabilistic expectations. The particular structure of 
our data will allow us to shed some light on a longstanding question in labor 
economics: calculating the expected returns on education.  
 
We used  a freely accessible internet survey to collect data on individuals’ 
expected median wages for different schooling scenario’s and we apply a 
method developed by Dominitz and Manski (1996) to elicit the individuals’ 
perceived dispersion of earnings. So far, this method has only been 
implemented in a controlled environment, under supervision and with direct 
feedback on inconsistent probability statements1. To our knowledge this is the 
first study concerning students’ wage expectations by an open inquiry at the 
                                                   
1 The Dominitz and Manski method was copied by Wolter (2000) and by Schweri et al (2008).   3
internet, covering many different studies, rather than a supervised data 
collection for a narrowly defined population. We will pay due attention to the 
pros and cons of this specific method, before analyzing the observations.  
 
As mentioned, the literature directly eliciting students’ expectations is quite 
scarce. Blau and Farber (1991) asked a sample of American college students to 
give a direct forecast of their entrance wage and their wage after ten and 
twenty years. Betts (1996) exploits another sample of undergraduate American 
college students to examine their knowledge about current salaries by type of 
education and to link the level of knowledge to specific individual 
characteristics concluding that the information possessed by students is rather 
accurate and specialized for field of interests. More recently, Zafar (2011) 
collected college students expectations about their major specific outcomes 
finding that even if prone to overconfidence about their academic performance, 
students update their expectations in expected ways.  We follow Dominitz and 
Manski (1996), who paid special attention to anticipated earnings dispersion. 
They elicited, from a small sample of both high school and college students, 
their income expectations at different moments of their life cycle conditional on 
different schooling scenarios. They also extrapolate a subjective earnings 
distribution, characterizing in this way the riskiness of educational investment. 
They find positive perceived returns to college education and awareness of the 
uncertain nature of the investment in their particular sample of students. 
Their main contribution resides in the methodological part of data collection. 
They clear some widespread skepticism on the use of expectation data. As they 
note, this antipathy, even though longstanding, is based on a narrow 
foundation2. In fact, they show that in their sample the internal consistency of 
the answers and of the variation of responses is rather high.  
 
Our use of high school students has the considerable advantage of targeting on 
the most relevant group of people, at the decisive moment for their educational 
                                                   
2 For a history on probabilistic expectations elicitation and their use in modern economic theory see, 
Manski (2004).   4
investment decision. Undeniably, the decision on undertaking tertiary 
education is the most relevant one in the process of human capital 
accumulation. Therefore, shedding some light on the information set and 
awareness of this particular group is of great interest in itself. The design of 
our survey will also allow us to check if the level of information increases as 
the time of choice approaches, as the human capital theory would suggest. An 
additional contribution of our work will be that of showing some findings about 
the role that perceived ethnic discrimination on the labor market might play 
already in the formation of students’ expectations.   
               
 
2. The Dutch educational system 
 
The Dutch schooling system3 is organized in three cycles: elementary school 
(Basisonderwijs), high school (Voortgezet Onderwijs) and tertiary education 
(Vervolgonderwijs).  
Elementary school is common to all pupils and caters for children from five 
(sometimes four) to twelve years old. At the end of this course of study a test – 
the so called CITO – is administered. The score of this test, jointly with the 
advice of elementary school teachers, determines in which of the three types of 
high schools a student is allowed to enroll.  
The three types of high schools provided for in this scheme are: VMBO 
(voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs, literally, “preparatory middle-
level vocational education”), HAVO (hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs, 
literally, "higher general continued education")  and VWO (voorbereidend 
wetenschappelijk onderwijs, literally, "preparatory scientific education"). 
VMBO lasts four years, from age twelve to sixteen. The type of curricula 
provided combine vocational training with theoretical education in languages, 
math, history, arts and sciences. A VMBO diploma gives direct access only to 
MBO (middelbaar beroepsonderwijs, literally, "middle-level vocational 
                                                   
3 See appendix for a summarizing scheme.   5
education"). This type of high school is the most practical of the three. To have 
access either to HBO or university, the two types of institutions in tertiary 
education, one needs to complete his education with an HAVO or VWO diploma 
respectively. 
HAVO takes one year longer than VMBO: from age twelve to seventeen. The 
five years of study are divided in two cycles. In the first three years subjects – 
languages, mathematics, history, arts and sciences – are common to all 
students and form the Basisvorming (literally, "basis education"). The last two 
years, the Tweede fase, are differentiated in four streams of study depending 
on the core subjects of a student’s elected curriculum. A HAVO diploma allows 
direct access to HBO and from there, after a year of study, to university 
education. 
VWO has six grades and is attended from age twelve to eighteen. VWO is 
divided in Atheneum and Gymnasium. The first one does not include classical 
languages, while the second one does. VWO guarantees direct access to 
university and it is mainly considered as a preparation to it.  
MBO cannot be regarded as tertiary education. It is vocationally oriented and 
mainly leads to middle management positions either in industry or in the 
service or government sectors. It lasts a maximum of four years. 
The proper tertiary education system is constituted by HBO (Hoger Beroeps 
Onderwijs, literally “higher professional education”) and WO (wetenschappelijk 
onderwijs, literally “scientific education” or university as commonly intended).  
Access to HBO is possible with an MBO, HAVO and VWO diploma. The course 
of study takes four years (three if coming from VWO) and it awards a bachelor 
degree. An additional one or two year of study lead to a master degree. 
University is directly accessible only from VWO or with a propedeuse year in 
HBO. WO is oriented towards theoretical higher learning in arts or sciences. It 
is now divided in two cycles: the first three years leading to a bachelor degree 
and an additional year (two in case of practical or research master) for a 
master degree.     
     
   6
 
3. The data    
 
3.1 Survey method 
Our survey was administered via internet from a freely accessible web page. 
The participation in the survey was completely voluntary. The survey was 
organized in collaboration with NIBUD, an institute for informing households 
on sound financial practice. NIBUD periodically runs a questionnaire among 
high school students (approximately 12-18 years old) in the Netherlands. The 
main objective is to learn about income and consumption behavior of the young. 
Next to many questions about the student’s jobs and their expenditures, the 
students are asked to provide some background information regarding their 
social-cultural background (for example, age, job status of their parents, and 
place where they live). In the 2006 wave, all students were asked the usual 
NIBUD questions. After these questions, the students of the bovenbouw (last 
years of high school) only  were asked additional questions, including those 
analyzed here. The link to the questionnaire was set at the NIBUD web page 
and at the MSN site (Windows Messenger4). Given the widespread use of this 
program among Dutch high school students, this gave us potential access to a 
wide and non selected audience. The questionnaire was made available for 
compilation between March and July 2006. On the internet page preceding the 
questionnaire it was explicitly stated that the questions were addressed 
specifically to high school students from whichever type of school, in the final 
two years.  
Even though the announcement of the site assures us of access to a non-
selective potential sample, our methodology might give rise to several concerns 
on selectivity of people effectively participating in the survey. We will try to 
address these concerns further on. On the other hand, a completely voluntary 
participation might reassure us on the carefulness of responses since it is hard 
                                                   
4 The program is freely downloadable from internet. In its Web Messenger version it doesn’t 
need an installation on the computer in use, making it, thus, available also from shared or 
public computers such as those available in public libraries or high schools computers.    7
to believe that a teenager would answer a questionnaire unless he is genuinely 
interested in it.  
 
Following the example of Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Schweri, Hartog 
and Wolter (2008) we asked questions about expected median earnings under 
different schooling scenarios. Each respondent is asked to declare his expected 
median earnings right after graduation and 10 years later in two different 
cases. First, under the hypothesis that he will continue after high school to his 
preferred education and finish it, second in case he will stop his schooling after 
graduation from the school he is enrolled in at the moment of the interview. 
 
In order to elicit their subjective earnings distribution the respondents were 
asked to report quantiles of this distribution. We simply asked them to report 
the probability that their expected wage would exceed 125% of the expected 
median and the probability it would fall short of 75% of their declared expected 
median wage – right after graduation and 10 years after it –. Since we cannot 
expect high school students to be familiar with the concept of the median, we 
gave a brief explanation of it immediately before we proceeded with these 
specific questions. The thresholds were given in euros rounded to the nearest 
50 E, as calculated from stated medians.  
 
Schooling expectations were also part of the enquiry. We asked if and where 
they wanted to continue their studies after their current school and what was 
the probability they would do so. To conclude, some background questions 
about the respondent and his/her family are asked. These questions include 
age, sex, father’s and mother’s education, school attended at the moment, 
school year attended and ethnicity of the respondent.  
 
3.2 Description of Respondents 
As noted, our survey was targeted at high school students of the three types of 
secondary school available in The Netherlands: VMBO, HAVO and VWO. The 
original sample was composed of 4707 individuals of which 1908 from VMBO,   8
1546 from HAVO and 1253 from VWO. However, for 2448 students the income 
variable is missing: 1409 for VMBO (74%), 586 for HAVO (38%) and 453 for 
VWO (36.1%). In fact, many respondents answered just the first few questions 
(on gender, age and education) and then quit. Also, there were 526 
observations with answers violating the definition of probability: 147 for 
VMBO (7.7%), 197 for HAVO (12.7%) and 182 for VWO (14.5%). Also, we 
imposed the restriction that students should be in the last two years of their 
school type, and this rules out some age categories (at age 15 you cannot 
normally have reached grade 5 of VWO). The data loss due to this choice is 
minor, however, 36 observations have been eliminated for this reason: 0 for 
VMBO, 13 for HAVO (0.8%) and 23 for VWO (1.8%).  Below, we will analyze 
non-response and inconsistencies, as they are important to assess the 
reliability of our analysis. Here we will just look at the descriptives of our 
resulting sample.   
 
Our final sample is composed of 1697 individuals: 352 from VMBO, 750 from 
HAVO and 595 from VWO. This is smaller than we hoped for, but still 
compares quite favorably to Dominitz and Manski and to Schweri et al. which 
used a sample of 110 (71 high school and 39 college) and 252 (all college) 
students respectively.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the sample we will use further on in our analyses are 
presented in table 1. The second column of table 1 describes the respondents 
from VMBO high schools. The majority of respondents are either 15 or 16, 16 
being the age of graduation for a regular course of study and 15 the 
penultimate year of study. All the respondents declare to attend their last year 
of study, which for this type of school is the fourth. The figures show these 
individuals to come mainly from poorly educated families. Only 35.23 percent 
of fathers and 37.21 percent of mothers have undertaken tertiary education, 
many have MBO. Quite high is also the percentage of respondents who do not 
know the educational level accomplished by their own parents.  
   9
The fourth column illustrates the characteristics of HAVO students. If we look 
at column four first we see how in this case the majority of respondents are 16 
and 17 years old, almost evenly divided between those two classes. Those are 
the ages we would expect from next-to-last and last year students from this 
kind of school. The family background is higher than for VMBO students.   
60.67 percent of fathers and 58.67 percent of mothers have a tertiary education 
degree and, especially for fathers, mainly HBO or university. The sixth column 
refers to VWO students. The respondents are logically older than the two other 
schools’ students. The greater part of them is either 17 or 18. There is a slight 
preponderance of fifth year students over the sixth year ones. Family 
background is constituted mainly by highly educated parents: 73.28 percent 
and 67.23 percent of fathers and mothers respectively have completed tertiary 
education.  
 
The ethnic origin of respondents is mainly Dutch. The VMBO sample of 
students is slightly more ethnically mixed. It is remarkable how our sample is 
unbalanced in gender composition: two thirds to three quarters are girls.   
 
 
4. How unreliable is an open internet survey? 
 
4.1 Specific sensitivities   
Our data gathering design might raise three sorts of concerns. In the first place, 
the free and voluntary participation to the survey could determine a strong self 
selection of our sample. Secondly, internet based surveys might be particularly 
affected by high attrition. This was not an issue, obviously, in laboratory data 
gathering. Last, as in every other survey study, the carefulness of self-reported 
answers can be questioned. 
 
At first sight our procedure is easily prone to self-selection. It is realistic to 
believe that first coming into contact and then compiling the whole   10
questionnaire entails stronger interest and better information on the questions 
at stake relative to the average high school student. In this scenario we could 
expect our sample to be composed either by students who are better informed 
and therefore less likely to systematically declare unrealistic wage 
expectations, or by students more willing to assert their career choices, more 
self assured about it and thus more likely to unconsciously self enhance their 
position in the future wage distribution. If that is what happened the external 
validity of our findings would be severely jeopardized. Consequently, our 
estimates of the level of information possessed at the time of choice would be 
higher than for the general high school students population or the level of 
declared expected wages could be upwardly biased.  
Internet based surveys are also intrinsically affected by missing data. Boredom, 
distractions and tedious compilation of numerous questions are all factors that 
might cause the respondent to abandon the questionnaire halfway. Since 
nobody can control respondents’ behaviors or force them to compile the entire 
set of questions, the number of people abandoning after few questions can be 
big. If that happens and it does not happen randomly in the sample, we might 
believe that those that finish the questionnaire are either the most interested 
in the questions at stake, or those that posses a higher level of concentration. 
In this case the sample used for analysis would be positively selected. Expected 
median wages would be upwardly biased. The variance of wage distributions 
might also be affected. In fact, we would draw conclusions from a sample of 
allegedly more able students digging less deep into the ability distribution and 
encountering lower variance of expected wages. More contradictory would be 
the result of positive selection on possible bias in expected to wages relative to 
actual wages. On one hand we might expect that more interested people are 
also better informed and, thus, more realistic in their expectations. On the 
other hand, if we selected better students they would tend to realistically locate 
themselves in the higher tail of the wage distribution.  
The last source of concern is something that our research shares with the rest 
of literature exploiting survey data. Even though Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and 
Sunde (2005), Dominitz and Manski (1994; 1996) and Manski (2004) all   11
produced evidence in support of consistency of data based on surveys, it is 
always quite hard to asses the carefulness and attention applied by 
respondents during the compilation of a questionnaire. In our case, a good 
indicator of careless answering could be an excess of bunching towards a few 
suspect values.  
 
We will address these issues to the extent possible with the information we 
h a v e  a v a i l a b l e .  W e  w i l l  i n  t u r n  consider non-response, bunching and 
inconsistencies.   
 
4.2 Non-response  
Table 1 shows the composition of the final sample we use and the sample of 
individuals that started to answer but gave up. We are interested in non-
response on the earnings expectations, but as noted above, this non-response 
essentially coincides with general non-response beyond the initiating questions 
on gender, age and school type attended. Other questions in the survey related 
to risk attitude and vignettes meant to elicit preferences determining schooling 
choices. Most of our responders quit the survey long before our question of 
interest 5. We see a remarkable discontinuity of missing values between 
questions thirteen and fourteen. Up to question twelve, demographical 
information was gathered. Question thirteen was a simple yes or no question 
asking whether or not the respondent receives money from his own parents. 
The following question (number fourteen) asked for the amount of money 
received and the possible use of that money. Question fourteen was answered 
by 1539 students less than the previous one. It is reasonable to think that 
many respondents could not be bothered to realistically answer to such a 
specific question and abandoned the survey.   
Essentially, the samples of “starters” and our final sample do not differ 
substantially in composition by observed characteristics. The only systematic 
factor is gender: girls are more prone to finish the questionnaire than boys. 
                                                   
5 Precisely fifty questions before.    12
This does not suggest that the response on the earnings questions is very 
selective.  
 
To check whether some particular characteristics correlate with the probability 
of leaving the sample incomplete, we run a probit regression on the probability 
of being or not being part of the early quitters group. The results of this 
regression are shown in table 2  
Column I shows regression of the probability of quitting (i.e. non-response on 
the earnings questions) on the available controls. Some specific characteristics 
show a significant impact on the decision of quitting the questionnaire. 
Females are 11% less likely to abandon than boys, while older students and 
students for higher classes are more likely to do so. Particularly strong is also 
the impact that having a low educated father exerts; 45% more prone to quit 
early. Mother’s education however, has no significant effect. Immigrants have 
no different probability of non-response, schooling level has no effect on non-
response. In the second regression, we differentiate father’s education by 
respondents’ school type attended. Now we see that for VMBO and HAVO 
students, family background does not differentiate: the dummy coefficients are 
more or less equal. Only for VWO students, family background has an effect, 
but it is not monotonic: with father’s education at medium level, non-response 
is markedly lower than both for higher and lower education fathers. Allowing 
for interaction now also brings out a marked school type effect: VMBO students 
have higher non-response than other students.   
 
4.3 Bunching  
In Table 3 we give one full specification of expected median earnings (starting 
salaries, in case of tertiary school completion). The declared expected starting 
wages are manifold and widely dispersed. The modal stated value, 2000 Euro 
per month, only attracts 14.59 percent of answers. A clear tendency of 
rounding at multiples of five and the presence of marked outliers at both ends 
of the distribution are also visible.  
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The bunching of expectations at multiples of integers, starting at 10 euro but 
then climbing to much higher base values, indicates that expectations have a 
rather crude nature. This is what one would anticipate: no one would think 
that students have expectations in multiples of one euro. The long tails of the 
distribution are perhaps more surprising. Some expectations are clearly far 
removed from actual earnings paid in the labor market. That does not rule out 
that there is a system in the pattern of expectations across alternatives, as we 
shall check below. The unrealistic values may indicate that earnings are not of 
prime concern in selecting an education.  
 
 
4.4 Inconsistencies  
Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Schweri et al. (2008) included feedback on 
inconsistent answers and had the survey filled in by students in a classroom 
situation, with a supervisor/instructor present. The laboratory setting of these 
studies allowed stopping the compiler once an inadmissible answer on a 
probability question is given and reminded the student of admissible values.  
Dominitz and Manski’s (1996) design added further help for the respondent. 
Along with the help screen in case of non-admitted answers, a training screen 
was provided before the proper survey was administered; a help screen was 
always available to the respondent and review-and-revise screens allowed the 
respondent to apply a last check on their answers before the final value was 
confirmed. 
  
We did not include any such feedback. Inconsistencies provide information on 
what respondents know and perceive and we did not want to compel students 
to conformity with rules they were not aware of. Instead, we analyse the 
occurrence of such inconsistencies. The only help we provided was an 
explanation of the concept of median right above the question regarding the 
expected median entry wage. 
Our question on the expected median entry wage was followed in the 
questionnaire by two probabilistic questions. The first asked the probability   14
that the received entry wage would be lower than 0.75 times the median wage, 
while the second asked the probability of receiving 1.25 times the median wage. 
We observed three types of mistakes related to these two queries: 
1.  The respondent declared a probability exceeding 1. 
2.  The respondent declared two tail probabilities which sum up to more 
than 1; 
3.  The respondent assigned a value exceeding – or equal to – .50 to either 
the left or the right tail of the distribution. 
 
We do not include inconsistent answers in our analysis of students’ earnings 
expectations.  This means we had to drop 526 observations, i.e. 23% of the 
sample. This compares favorably with Schweri et al., who interview students at 
tertiary level (higher vocational education). In that questionnaire, a student 
has to specify 20 probabilities. 65 percent of the respondents never made any 
error, 20 percent made one error, 11 percent made two errors and the 
remaining 4 percent made more than two errors (the worst was a single person 
with 7 errors). In Dominitz and Manski (1996) also, the share of respondents 
declaring a probability inconsistent with the previously reported median is 
comparable and in some case even higher than our case. Depending on the 
scenario, the values vary from a minimum of 11% to a maximum of 40%. 
  
Table 4summarizes the frequencies of these three types of mistakes in each 
subsample6. As we can see from this table type 1 errors are extremely rare and 
are almost evenly distributed in the three samples. Type 2 errors are rare as 
well, but some differentiation between the three samples is observable: VMBO 
students are more prone to this kind of error. Anyway, the bulk of errors are 
constituted by type 3. Once again, VMBO students show more often problems 
in grasping the concept of the median – as having 50% of the probability on 
each side – or in understanding our instructions. 
                                                   
6 The percentages of mistakes differ in table 4 from those reported on page 7. The reference 
population, in fact, changes in the two cases. The figures on page 7 refer to the general 
population of people that started the questionnaire, whilst table 4 refers only to those people 
that answered to the wage distribution questions.    15
 
We run a probit analysis to scrutinize whether making one of the three 
mistakes listed above is correlated with any observable characteristic. The 
dependent variable is in this case whether a respondent fell in any kind of 
mistake or not (type 1 and type 2 errors are too few to distinguish the three 
types). The dummy dependent variable will assume value 1 if the respondent 
answered inconsistently and 0 otherwise. 
 
The results in Table 5 tell a clear story. Girls make fewer errors, immigrant 
children make more errors and students with low educated mothers make 
more errors. The latter effect appears to be located exclusively among HAVO 
students. The insignificance of the other variables is at least as interesting. In 
particular, we find no significant differences between types of school attended, 
between fathers with different levels of education or by type of intended 
education after graduation from the present school (Column IV). In column IV 
we also include the stated probability to graduate from the intended further 
education, and this has no significant effect either. Including future intentions 
interacted with school of origin as covariates can give us a rough idea of the 
ability of each respondent, or at least the perceived own ability. Better 
students, or at least students with a higher taste for education, should declare 
their intention to proceed with their studies either to university or HBO, while 
weaker students are more likely to start working after school or complete their 
education with an MBO degree. Future intentions might also have a 
heterogeneous effect depending on the school of origin. We might believe that a 
student declaring his will to finish education after VMBO is a different type of 
student and has potentially different ability to understand the concept of 
median than his VWO peer declaring the same intention. We would infer an 
effect of ability to understand our questionnaire if the coefficients would follow 
a monotonically increasing path from VMBO school quitters to VWO future 
university students. This pattern is not visible in our data. People wanting to 
quit their studies, continue to MBO or continue to HBO do not have a lower 
propensity to slip-up no matter which school they are attending at the moment   16
of the interview. Covariates are mainly unaffected by the inclusion of 
heterogeneous schooling effects. The variables that were significant before 
remain significant and vice versa. 
Column IV also includes adds an ulterior control for ability: the self-stated 
probability of tertiary studies completion7. We see that being more or less 
certain on graduation has no effect on the probability of committing a mistake. 
 
The story told by our data can comfort us for the selectivity of the sample. Our 
dropped observations, in fact, don’t seem, from this analysis, to belong to any 
easily detectable disadvantaged group of students. This result gives us some 
confidence on the reliability of the further analysis that will exploit only those 
respondents able to correctly interpret the three wage distribution questions.   
 
4.5 Assessment 
Response to our survey shows a very specific pattern. Participants begin by 
answering the first basic questions (age, gender, school type) and then either 
quit or more or less fill out the entire questionnaire. Non-response is lower 
among girls, higher among VMBO students. Parental education has negligible 
effect. Students in their last school year are more inclined to answer than those 
in their penultimate year, which reflects growing interest in future careers. 
Bunching of expected median earnings is strong, but whether this is stronger 
than one should anticipate for this kind of information is hard to judge. 
Violations of the rules of probability are not more frequent in our open internet 
survey than in the data collected by Dominitz and Manski (1996) and by 
Schweri et al. (2008) for narrowly defined groups of students. Girls make 
significantly fewer errors than boys. Violations do not vary by type of school 
attended and do not vary either with other observable indicators of ability: 
intended continuation of education and self-assessed probability to succeed in 
                                                   
7 The reason why the number of observations in this regression is inferior to the other three is, 
obviously, that students not willing to continue to tertiary education are here dropped since 
they do not declare any probability of tertiary school completion.    17
prolonged education. Immigrant children and children with lower educated 
mothers commit more errors.   
 
In terms of relationships to observable characteristics there are no compelling 
reasons for serious concern on the quality and selectivity of the dataset. In 
terms of relationship to unobservables this is by nature harder to assess. The 
absence of a dominant ability effect, for given level of high school, on violations 
of the rules of probability may probably be extrapolated to some confidence in 
this respect.  
 
              
5. Expectations: median earnings 
 
5.1 Characterizing the observations  
We report the expected earnings distribution of our sample of students in table 
6, both for starting wages (panel A) and after 10 years (Panel B). Recall that 
we elicited six different earnings expectations from each respondent. Figures 1 
to 4 present graphs of the data. The wage data refer to intended continued 
education, no matter present school attended. This implies that the graph for 
“To Work” is heterogeneous in completed educations.  
 
Taking a look both at figure 1 and 2 and at table 6, we note five regularities in 
these data. First, for all destination groups we find high within-group variation; 
between-group variations are smaller. Second, expected median earnings by 
girls are always smaller than expected medians by boys; the gender difference 
increases with level of education. Third, for expectations when not continuing 
education, medians increase with schooling level, with a big jump towards 
VWO: expected medians for VMBO and HAVO are not too far apart, expected 
medians for VWO are about double the level for HAVO. Fourth, expected 
medians for continued education are generally higher than for going to work 
after graduation, and increase with level of continued education, but there are   18
exceptions. Fifth, expected earnings distributions shift upward with experience; 
respondents are conscious of the increasing wage profile in the life cycle of a 
person. If we compare panel A with panel B we see that within group variation 
of expected medians does not diminish with time, on the contrary. Gender 
differences become more marked and university ceases to be perceived as the 
strikingly more rewarding type of education.  
 
5.2 Do they mirror actual data? 
It would be interesting to compare individuals’ expectations with actual data. 
However, as we have no observations on individuals’ realizations, we can at 
best compare expectations with group means of actual data. The exercise would 
be of limited value. Therefore, we decided to take into consideration two other 
dimensions: the gender gap and the wage growth by experience. The data on 
actual wages – by highest degree obtained, gender and age – are taken from 
the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS henceforth) survey for the year 
2002.    
Since absolute differences would not be informative, we interpret relative 
differences, namely between gender wage gap and life cycle wage profiles, as a 
rough, but significant, indicator of our sample’s level of awareness of actual 
wage structure 
We can not definitely rule out the possibility that disproportionate gender 
wage gap or unrealistic wage growth are reflecting the effect of unobservable – 
for us – characteristics of the respondents. Anyhow, given that we have neither 
positively nor negatively selected either men or women, or equally, that the 
type and severity of selection is the same across these two groups – an 
assumption that in light of our previous analysis does not seem excessively 
bold –, a comparison of the expected with the effective gender wage gap can 
provide a measure of how anchored to reality expectations are. This is what we 
have done and what we report in table 7.  
The first column of table 7 reports the wage gap, in percentage, that women 
experience when compared to men with the same level of education as reported 
in the CBS survey for the year 2002. In the second column we show the   19
difference between the median female and the median male expected median 
wages in our survey by educational category as reported in table 5. Column III 
is the difference between the previous two columns. Column IV reports the 
coefficient of the dummy female – always negative – taken from wage 
regressions by educational outcome8. This coefficient is, thus, obtained after 
controlling for age, family background and ethnicity. To conclude, column 5 is 
the difference between column IV and I.  
What is evident from column V is the systematic underestimation that, with 
the exception of VMBO, females make of their own future wages compared to 
men. Our female respondents add, on top of the already substantial gap 
recorded in labor market data, a handicap varying – only considering the 
significant coefficients – from 18.2% to 38.9%. This skepticism appears to 
decrease further on in the life cycle: in panel B, the difference in perceptions is 
closer to actual gap.  
Table 8 considers the wage growth along the career path. The same structure 
of table 7 applies here. Column I reports wage growth as recorded in CBS 
(2002) data, column II the wage growth expected by the median respondent in 
our sample by gender, current education and future education. Column III is 
the difference between column II and I. Column IV reports the coefficient of the 
dummy 10 years after in a wage regression pooled by scenario and stratified by 
gender and declared future education9. To conclude, column V is the difference 
between column IV and III. 
 At a first glance, what should immediately strike us is the low adherence of 
expected wage dynamics to recorded wage dynamics. The sign of mistakes 
                                                   
8 The estimated regression takes the form: ln       ccc c i c c WF X  where  W indicates 
the logarithm of expected wages, F a dummy taking value 1 for females, X a vector of controls 
for family background, age and ethnicity a disturbance term and c the specific educational 
category that the respondent declared to have the intention to be part of. The coefficient shown 
in table 7 isc   
9 The exact wage equation estimated here is: 
,, , , , , , ,, 10 10 _ ln
cg cg cg cg icg cg cg cg AFT STOP AFT STOP X W          . 
Where W indicates the expected entry wage, 10AFT, STOP and 10AFT_STOP the scenario dummies X a 
vector of controls for family background, age and ethnicity, a disturbance term, c the specific 
educational category that the respondent declared to have the intention to be part of and g the 
gender. The coefficient reported in column IV is  , cg  .    20
changes without an apparent pattern; it does not follow a monotonic path from 
lower to higher educational category or vice versa and is equally substantial for 
both girls and boys. It is also quite remarkable that controlling for family 
background, age and ethnicity equalizes the expected growth: the coefficients 
of column IV are all pretty close to 0.6.    
Always keeping in mind that our type of questions were not designed for a 
specific investigation of awareness possessed, and that we cannot rule out the 
possibility that private information plays a role in the formation of 
expectations, the two abovementioned comparisons could shed some doubt on 
the overall quality of knowledge on real labor market dynamics and conditions 
in our particular high school students sample. The gap in wage expectation 
between men and women is substantially larger than the gap in actual mean 
wages between men and women. Growth in expected wages over the future 10 
years differs substantially from actual growth in mean wages, but there is no 
systematic under or overestimation detected.        
                   
5.3 Explaining expected medians 
In Tables 9, 10 and 11, we report results of estimated wage regressions for 
expected medians, for VMBO, HAVO and VWO students respectively. Recall 
that the respondents were asked to declare median wages (and wage 
dispersions) in four different scenarios:  
1.  Entry wage in case of secondary education degree only; 
2.  Entry wage given tertiary education degree; 
3.  Wage after ten years of work in case of secondary education degree only; 
4.  Wage after ten years of work in case of tertiary education degree. 
 
We estimated four different equations for each different scenario.  
 
Tables 9, 10 and 11 show some clear results. First, girls expect between 24 and 
46% lower medians than boys. The effect is present in all scenario’s for all 
school types. Second, there is no clear systematic effect of family background 
on expected medians. Mother’s education has no effect at all (among 24   21
coefficients, only one is significant), Father’s education has no effect at all for 
HAVO students, low education reduces expected starting salaries for VMBO 
students, low and median education increases expected salaries in some 
scenario’s for VWO. Whereas the empirical literature generally finds a positive 
effect of better family backgrounds on earnings, we do not observe this pattern 
in our regressions. Third, ethnicity (“immigrant”) has no effect on expected 
medians. Fourth, the evidence on self-selection in expected benefits is mixed at 
best. Among VMBO students, there is nowhere a significant difference in 
expected wages between those who go to work and those who continue 
education. Those who do continue expect lower salaries in all scenarios than 
those who do not continue. This is probably not what one would have predicted: 
those who do continue are not the better students in terms of their expected 
wages under all scenarios. However, choice is supposed to respond to the mark-
up on tertiary education and this is what we will consider in section 7. 
Among HAVO students, again no wage difference between those who continue 
school and those who go to work is statistically significant. Only among VWO 
students we do find significant expected wage differences between those who 
go to university and those who don’t. Those who do not intend to attend 
university expect close to 20% lower wages from university degree than those 
who do, whereas they also expect a lower wage if they go straight to work after 
completing VWO – although not significantly so. Now, the expected probability 
of completion is also significant: students with higher expected probability to 
complete university have lower expected opportunity costs from attending 
university. In all other cases, self-rated probability to complete a tertiary 
education has no significant effect on any expected wage.     
 
 
6. Expectations: Quantifying risk 
  
6.1 Measuring risk and skewness 
In the literature on the Risk Augmented Mincer earnings function (King, 1974; 
Hartog and Vijverberg 2007; Hartog, Plug, Serrano and Vieira, 2003; Diaz-  22
Serrano, Hartog and Nielsen,  2003) it is common to characterize risk as the 
dispersion of wages around the mean for a particular educational group to 
which the individual belongs. However, this approach has been criticized for 
drawing conclusions from ex-post wage realizations to measure ex-ante wage 
risk (Cunha, Heckman and Navarro, 2005). The variance found in wage data is 
not necessarily imputable to uncertainty. Heterogeneity may play an 
important role as well. Individuals may be better informed than researchers 
about their own ability and they will use this superior knowledge when 
forming their wage expectations. Neglecting heterogeneity will cause an 
overestimation of risk (Cunha et al. 2005). Our strategy to overcome this 
criticism is that of asking students directly about their expectations as in 
Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Schweri et al. (2008). 
 
As explained in Section 3.1, for each respondent we have three points of his 
expected earnings distribution: 1.00, 0.75 and 1.25 times the median of their 
wage, at entry and ten years later. If we want to calculate variance and 
skewness from this information we need to impose some distributional 
assumptions. Dominitz and Manski fitted a log-normal distribution. Since we 
doubt that such a distribution would reflect correctly the distribution that 
respondents had in mind, we will not impose any distributional assumption. 
On the contrary, for our measure of risk we will follow the steps of Schweri et 
al. (2008) and specify an alternative indicator for variance and skewness.  
The three points of the distribution that we know make it possible to divide the 
probability density function in four intervals: (0-0.75*m] (0.75*m-m] (m-1.25*m] 
(1.25*m-), m indicating the declared expected median value. We denote the 
probability masses lying in the four intervals as A, B, C and D respectively. By 
the definition of median A+B=C+D=0.5. A measure of variance could thus be 
given by the share of probability assigned to the outer intervals of the 
distribution:  v=(A+D).  v  lies between 0 and 1 and it will be our variance 
indicator.  
The skewness coefficient exploits a similar stratagem. In fact, looking at the 
asymmetry of the distribution, we can obtain our skewness coefficient s  as   23
given by: s=2(D-A) and it varies between -1 and 1. A positive value indicates 
positive skewness, the opposite holds for a negative value. 
 
6.2 Characterizing variance and skewness 
In figures 5 to 12 we provide a visual description of the distributions of the 
variance and skewness coefficients across individuals in our sample. The 
distributions are defined on a fixed interval for a total of 1693 cases10: 1207 
girls and 486 boys.  
What emerges from a visual analysis is the high risk perceived by many. In 
fact, even though the distribution is almost symmetrical around 0.5, many of 
the individuals in our sample foresee a variance coefficient equal to one, the 
maximum possible (admittedly, this implies a somewhat weird distribution, 
with no probability mass between 0.75m and 1.25m).11 
It is also remarkable to note that type of education doesn’t affect the level of 
risk: the four distributions are very similar to another. Girls perceive higher 
wage risk and both boys and girls expect wage variance to decrease with time. 
For the skewness coefficient the story is somehow simpler. For entry wages, 
the distributions are almost symmetrical around zero, with most of 
observations concentrated around the mean. The high frequency of a 
symmetric distribution (skew equal to zero) is also remarkable.  
No significant gender or future school type differentiation is traceable. What is 
striking is the noteworthy translation to the right that this distribution shows 
after 10 years from entry into the labor market. Once again the same path 
emerges for boys and girls and for whichever type of degree earned. 
 
6.3 Explaining variance and skew 
In tables 12-15, we present regression results for variance and skewness, 
stratified by type of education as before. Barely any of our explanatory 
                                                   
10 The cases for females divide as follows: 198 for MBO, 611 for HBO, 378 for University and 20 
go to work. For males the specific figures are: 85 for MBO, 209 for HBO, 175 for University and 
17 go to work.  
11  328 respondents reported a peculiar wage distribution for which the variance coefficient 
equals 0 and the skewness coefficient equals 1.   24
coefficients is statistically significant. There is some inclination for women to 
expect higher variance in their future earnings distributions notably for VMBO 
and VWO students. For VWO students the magnitude does not depend on 
scenario, while for VMBO students it is higher for tertiary education. Joint 
with higher risk aversion among women, this would cout as a deterrent on 
continued education. The overriding impression from the tables is lack of 
systematic influences: neither ethnicity, nor family background, nor “ability” 
(intended further studies, probability to complete) have any explanatory power.  
 
There are three potential interpretations. The results may reflect purely 
private information (expectations only depend on unobservables), complete 
randomness (there is no useful information in the answers), or they may reflect 
variation in perceptions of actual labor outcomes. The first interpretation is not 
very convincing. If individuals were to use unobservable private information, 
one would expect them also to use information on their abilities, such as 
intended further studies and probability to graduate. The third interpretation 
can not be tested with the present dataset, but finds some support in analysis 
of comparable Swiss data (Schweri et al., 2008). The second interpretation may 
be tested by linking perceived risk to actual behavior; one might, for example, 
relate educational choice to perceived risk in combination with information on 
individuals’ risk attitude.  This would also require additional information.   
 
 
7. Expectations: returns to education 
  
7.1 Eliciting perceived returns to education 
As noted before our survey elicited wage expectations in four different 
scenarios12. This particular feature of the questionnaire allow us to calculate 
the perceived returns to education for subjects declaring expected earnings, 
                                                   
12 See section 5.3.    25
evolution in time given the accomplishment of a particular education and the 
counterfactual in case of non accomplishment. 
The internal rate of return to education is the rate of discount ρ equating the 
present values of lifetime earnings for the two different scenarios – 
accomplishment or non accomplishment of desired tertiary education. We can 





















        (1.1) 
The left and right hand side of the equation describe the life cycle earnings of 
an individual in case of no further education and in case of accomplished 
tertiary education respectively.  1 y  indicates the expected earnings at time of 
entry in the labor market ( 0 t ), in our case this time is equal to zero. The second 
period of life starts at  1 t , which as we have said, for us corresponds to ten years 
after leaving school, and  2 y  are the expected earnings during this period until 
retirement age which occurs at T. We assume retirement age to occur forty 
years after entry in the labor market without extended education. On the right 
hand side of equation 1.1 s is the additional years of schooling necessary to 
obtain the diploma each respondent declared to be willing to achieve. Expected 
earnings in case of tertiary education completion are described by  3 y  for entry 
wages and  4 y  for wages starting ten years after graduation.  
We posses information about the four different y  directly provided by the 
respondents. It is then possible to plug in these values in equation 1.1 and 
numerically solve it, obtaining our parameter of interest ρ13. 
Some descriptive statistics of the distribution of the perceived rate of return to 
education in our sample are provided in table 18. As we can see it does not 
differ at all between genders. Both females and males show a median perceived 
rate of return equal to 0.17 with the same inter-quantile range (IQR) as well 
(0.18). HBO students present the lower expected return from their educational 
                                                   
13 For this purpose we used the software matlab inputting the possessed data and exploiting the automatic 
equation solver provided in this software.     26
investment (0.13) for both men and women, whilst future university students 
the highest with 0.23. Future HBO students also show the lowest IQR – 0.15 
for women and 0.17 for men – while future workers the highest – 0.44 for 
female and 0.25 for men.    
 
7.2 Characterizing perceived returns to education 
Figures 13 and 14 report the distribution of perceived returns to education 
stratified by future education for males and females respectively. We are not 
differentiating here by current education, even though we are aware that such 
a distinction might be useful, because further fragmentation of our sample 
would make this visual analysis somehow less significant. In the next section, 
performing regression analysis on the determinants of expected returns to 
education, we will control for both present and future education.      
From these distributions it seems clear that no dramatic differences exist 
between the three types of schooling for both men and women. Two 
characterizing factors emerge. First, expected returns for future HBO students 
are slightly lower with a fatter left tail of the distribution. Second, future 
MBO’s students present a lower dispersion around the median. Both these 
facts are common to boys and girls.  
 
7.3 Explaining perceived returns to education 
Table 19 presents simple OLS regressions on our usual demographics, family 
background characteristics and proxies for ability – intention to continue and 
self-stated probability of completion – on the perceived returns to education 
stratified by respondents’ current school as obtained from equation 1.1. 
Just like for the variance and skewness regression, also in this case the 
observables at hand have a really low explanatory power. Ethnicity and family 
background have no systematic effect on expected returns. Only the probability 
of completion shows a positive contribution to the perceived benefit of 
education for both VMBO and VWO students. “Better” students expect a 
higher rate of return. In the case of VWO students also the dummy “not 
university” has a strong negative effect on the dependent variable. This is an   27
interesting corroboration of self-selection: students intending to continue to 
university have substantially higher rate of return than those who do not 
intend to continue.  
One thing that clearly emerges from this simple regression is the lack of any 
gender differential in expected returns. Even though women expect to earn less 
in their future careers, they do not perceive their investment to be less 
profitable than men. 
  
 
8. Testing the risk augmented Mincer earnings function.  
 
The Risk Augmented Mincer earnings regression takes the form: 
      123 ln ii i i i wX R K . (1.2) 
In this equation i R  and  i K measure risk and skewness, respectively, while  i X  
represents the usual vector of personal characteristics, including schooling. If 
our sample is composed by risk averse people, we would expect R to positively 
affect wages. That is because risk averse individuals will request, through 
higher wages, compensation for the uncertainty they dislike. The effect of K 
should, instead, be negative. Workers appreciate a wage distribution skewed to 
the right. They would be ready to pay for this preference by accepting lower 
wages. These effects are commonly observed using both realization data 
(Hartog and Vijverberg, 2007; Hartog et al. 2003; Diaz-Serrano et al. 2003) and 
expectations data (Schweri et al. 2008).  
 
Estimated regressions with the present dataset do not support the predictions. 
The variance coefficient has statistically insignificant effect in every subsample 
and in every scenario. The skewness coefficient shows a significant, but 
positive effect on expected median wage. We have no convincing explanation 
for this stark contrast between the results on the Swiss university students 
and our dataset of high school students. Perhaps there are differences between 
high school students and university students that do provide an explanation:   28
university students, being older, may have a better understanding of the labor 
market. Note however, that ability to understand the workings of the labor 
market or to understand the survey questions is not a strong candidate for 





We started this work with some questions in mind: the level of knowledge of 
Dutch high school students on labor market conditions both in terms of wages 
paid and in terms of variability of wages; the dynamics of information 
accumulation; the presence of perceived discrimination that by itself might 
influence realized wages via lower benefits from effort. Under a methodological 
point of view, the present paper being the first in this field dealing with an 
internet based survey, we had to examine whether such a methodology is 
suitable for our intentions. 
Our internet based survey allowed us to easily and quickly come into contact 
with a vast audience of respondents blowing up the number of observations 
available. We did not find compelling evidence that our survey is evidently 
biased, e.g.: towards abler or more interested students. The number of 
erroneous answers – as violations of probability theory – was comparable with 
earlier, laboratory led, experiments, but by omitting feedback on the errors we 
did loose a large number of observations.  Mostly, our survey was afflicted by a 
high number of early quitters. The population to which our survey was 
addressed might be particularly prone to leaving surveys unaccomplished. 
Coming into contact with a questionnaire via internet and probably at home 
with no supervision deprived this questionnaire of some importance in the eyes 
of teenagers. It is not unlikely that many of them started it only to kill some 
time and easily stopped once bored or once they realized that some 
concentration was required. This problem would, presumably, afflict every 
internet based survey addressed to such a young population and is not specific   29
to the method of obtaining information on wage expectations.  Probably a more 
accurate design, length and phrasing could contribute in minimizing the 
number of early quitters. 
The questionnaire generated many interesting conclusions. As in earlier work, 
the direct survey method points to wide dispersion of expected median 
earnings among individuals, but few systematic influences can be established. 
The same holds for variance and skewness. Students allow for wide dispersion 
in the wages distributions associated with a particular education scenario and 
dispersions vary strongly between individuals. But again, there are very few 
systematic patterns that can explain the differences between individuals. In 
particular, the absence of influence of family background and ability indicators 
is at variance with what self-selection models based on private information 
would lead one to anticipate. Surprisingly enough they do not seem to demand 
any type of compensation for this risk.  
A most remarkable result in our analysis is the systematic lower wage 
expectations that females have for themselves. However, this is a systematic 
effect in all expectations and by consequence, anticipated rates of return to 
education do not vary by gender. The offspring of originally non-Dutch families 
do not share lower wages than natives.  
Rates of returns implicit in students’ expectations show wide variation across 
individuals with a mean of 0.17 and an interquartile range of 0.18 for both 
genders. Anticipated rates of return differ by education but not monotonically 
with education level.  
Some evidence is in line with self-selection models. Perceived probabilities to 
complete an extended education increase the perceived rate of return, for 
VMBO and VWO students, not for HAVO students. And secondary school 
students that do not intend to continue to university foresee a lower return to 
university training than students that do intend to continue. But in expected 
earnings levels we do not see patterns in line with self-selection; among VMBO 
students  and among HAVO students, wage expectations do not differ by 
intention to continue or not.  
   30
In all, we think the method of Dominitz and Manski can certainly be applied in 
open internet surveys. But much more work is needed to unravel the precise 
nature of  wage expectations.    31
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Table 1. Characteristics of respondents (in percentages) 














N  1908 352    1546 750    1253  595 
Female  57.49 63.92 66.75 74.93  65.68  71.13 
Age      
14 13.84  2.27  1.36  0  0.08  0 
15  33.60 25.85 15.98 15.87 3.35  0 
16  31.76 51.99 34.15 35.73  21.71  23.87 
17 8.56  15.06  30.72  34.00  34.56  42.69 
18 or more  8.96  4.83  17.59  14.40  40.06  33.45 
Year in school     
4th year  48.68  100  50.45  49.47  0  0 
5th year  2.22  0  49.55  50.53  49.64  52.44 
6th year  2.80  0  0  0  50.36  47.56 
Father's education      
Primary  education  or  similar  8.63 7.39 4.28 4.00  3.61  2.69 
VMBO  or  similar  22.97 26.14 16.93 15.73  10.82  12.94 
HAVO/VWO or similar   8.4  7.67  9.71  8.13  7.97  6.72 
MBO  or  similar  17.93 20.17 22.96 24.00  19.38  21.85 
HBO/University  or  similar  16.02 15.06 34.87 36.67  52.85  51.43 
Doesn't know  22.91  20.45  9.84  9.87  4.87  4.20 
Not applicable (no father)  3.14  3.13  1.41  1.60  0.50  0.17 
Mother's education      
Primary  education  or  similar  8.24 6.25 4.28 2.93  3.52  2.52 
VMBO  or  similar  25.77 26.99 19.61 18.67  13.93  13.61 
HAVO/VWO or similar   10.14  7.39  11.71  10.80  11.33  11.93 
MBO  or  similar  21.23 25.85 29.12 32.27  22.82  23.87 
HBO/University  or  similar  10.76 11.36 26.17 26.40  43.29  43.36 
Doesn't know  22.13  20.74  8.23  8.27  4.87  4.37 
Not applicable (no mother)  1.74  1.42  0.87  0.67  0.25  0.34 
Ethnicity      
Dutch 88.7  92.05  93.56  95.07  93.45  95.63 
Moroccan  2.87 1.42 1.34 1.60  0.84  0.67 
Turkish  2.27 2.02 1.33 1.32  0.92  0.17 
Surinamer  3.04 1.14      2.15 2.13  2.35  1.34 
Antillean  1.57 1.14 1.01 0.93  0.67  0.17 
Belgian  1.57 1.14 0.74 0.53  0.92  0.67 
Other 8.77  6.82  5.7  5.20  7.06  6.55 
Note: The respondents could select more than one option for the ethnicity question therefore the percentages 
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Table 2. Probit regression for non responses (marginal effects) 
 I  II 
Female -0.115***(0.016)  -0.126***(0.016) 
Age 0.049***(0.008)  -0.015*(0.007) 
School year penultimate  0.273***(0.017)  0.201***(0.016) 
Immigrant  0.015(0.023) 0.034(0.022) 
Father's education low  0.456***(0.019)   
Father's education medium  0.053*(0.021)   
Mother's education low  -0.010(0.038) 0.003(0.037) 
Mother's education medium  -0.038(0.022) -0.022(0.021) 
VMBO  -0.013(0.038)  
HAVO  -0.016(0.021)  
Father education low: VMBO    0.208***(0.039) 
Father education medium: VMBO    0.186***(0.026) 
Father education high: VMBO    0.169***(0.023) 
Father education low: HAVO    -0.182**(0.066) 
Father education medium: HAVO    -0.142***(0.031) 
Father education high: HAVO    -0.193***(0.021) 
Father education low: VWO   -0.093(0.083) 
Father education medium: VWO    -0.240***(0.036) 
PseudoR2  0.143 0.103 
N  4.707 4.707 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 
10%/5%/1%.  Reference group: Male, last year of high school, Dutch, VWO, father’s 
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Table 3. Frequencies of values for elicited medians – entry wages   
Reported 
value 
Freq.  Percent  Reported 
value 
Freq.  Percent  Reported 
value 
Freq.  Percent 
0  16  0.93  1120  1  0.06  3000  81  4.73 
1 4  0.23  1150  2  0.12  3100  1  0.06 
3 1  0.06  1195  1  0.06  3200  1  0.06 
10 2  0.12  1200  102  5.95  3250  1  0.06 
17 1  0.06  1250  14  0.82  3400  1  0.06 
20 1  0.06  1300  23  1.34  3500  21  1.23 
50 10  0.58  1350  7  0.41  3600  1  0.06 
60 2  0.12  1400  20  1.17  4000  22  1.28 
70 1  0.06  1450  1  0.06  4028  1  0.06 
75 1  0.06  1500  220  12.84  4500  3  0.18 
80 2  0.12  1519  1  0.06  5000  30  1.75 
90 1  0.06  1530  1  0.06  5500  1  0.06 
100 19  1.11  1550  2  0.12  6000  3  0.18 
115 1  0.06  1600  26  1.52  6500  1  0.06 
120 2  0.12  1700  33  1.93  7000  3  0.18 
130 1  0.06  1750  11  0.64  7500  2  0.12 
136 1  0.06  1800  56  3.27  7890  1  0.06 
150 9  0.53  1843  1  0.06  8000  2  0.12 
200 26  1.52  1900  8  0.47  9000  1  0.06 
250 7  0.41  1950  1  0.06  10000  7  0.41 
251 1  0.06  1981  1  0.06  11000  1  0.06 
255 1  0.06  2000  250  14.59  12000  1  0.06 
300 27  1.58  2068  1  0.06  13000  2  0.12 
320 1  0.06  2100  8  0.47  15000  1  0.06 
350 5  0.29  2125  1  0.06  16000  1  0.06 
400 9  0.53  2166  1  0.06  20000  1  0.06 
440 1  0.06  2200  18  1.05  70000  1  0.06 
450 4  0.23  2250  2  0.12  100000  1  0.06 
500 73  4.26  2300  8  0.47      
550 2  0.12  2350  1  0.06  Total  1,714  100 
560 2  0.12  2360  1  0.06       
600 20  1.17  2400  11  0.64      
650 2  0.12  2500  90  5.25       
700 20  1.17  2510  1  0.06      
750 11  0.64  2600  1  0.06      
780 1  0.06  2700  3  0.18       
800 58  3.38  2750  3  0.18      
850 1  0.06  2800  3  0.18       
900 22  1.28  2810  1  0.06      
1000 190  11.09 2848  1  0.06       
1100 22  1.28 2916 1  0.06       
1111 1  0.06  2996  1  0.06      
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Table 4. Mistakes by Type and School (in percentages) 
  VMBO  HAVO  VWO 
Declared probability exceeds 1.00  1.4 1.1  0.9 
Sum of probabilities exceeds 1.00  5.4 2.9  3.0 
Probability in tail below/above median exceeds .50  27.8 19.0  21.9 
Total  29.4 20.5  22.7 
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Table 5.  Probit regression for errors (marginal effects) 
  I II  III  IV 
       
Female  -0.068***(0.020)  -0.065**(0.020) -0.068***(0.020)  -0.065**(0.021) 
Age  -0.010(0.013) -0.008(0.013) -0.010(0.011)  -0.008(0.013) 
School year  0.010(0.025) 0.010(0.025) 0.007(0.023)  0.012(0.025) 
Immigrant  0.111***(0.030) 0.104***(0.031) 0.112***(0.030)  0.105***(0.031) 
VMBO  0.039(0.036)      
HAVO  -0.030(0.022)      
Father's education low  0.024(0.045) 0.029(0.045) 0.023(0.045)  0.040(0.047) 
Father's education medium  0.004(0.025) 0.005(0.025) 0.002(0.025)  0.005(0.025) 
Mother's education low  0.164**(0.053)  0.165**(0.053)   0.161**(0.054) 
Mother's education medium  0.028(0.024) 0.028(0.024)    0.026(0.024) 
From VMBO to work/MBO   0.029(0.038)   0.027(0.039) 
From VMBO to HBO/WO   0.086(0.057)   0.086(0.057) 
From HAVO/VWO to work/MBO   0.022(0.061)   -0.005(0.076) 
From HAVO to HBO   -0.040(0.024)   -0.040(0.024) 
From HAVO to university   0.048(0.054)   0.049(0.054) 
From VWO to HBO   -0.012(0.038)   -0.012(0.038) 
Mother education low: VMBO     0.147(0.085)   
Mother education medium: VMBO     0.088(0.047)   
Mother education high: VMBO     0.057(0.042)   
Mother education low: HAVO     0.217**(0.083)   
Mother education medium: HAVO     -0.004(0.033)   
Mother education high: HAVO     -0.017(0.024)   
Mother education low: VWO     0.144(0.104)   
Mother education medium: VWO     0.035(0.038)   
Probability of completion      0.000(0.000) 
PseudoR2  0.027 0.029 0.027  0.032 
N  2.207 2.207 2.207  2.154 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.  Reference group: 
Male, last year of high school, Dutch, VWO, father’s education high, mother’s education high, from VWO to 
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Table 6.  Earnings Expectations 
A. Quantiles of expected earnings after graduation 
  
  
Stop Studying after current school  Proceeding to MBO  Proceeding to HBO  Proceeding to University 
    Empirical Quantile  Empirical Quantile  Empirical Quantile  Empirical Quantile 
Respondent 
Group  0.1 0.5  0.9  0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9 
Female VMBO  200 800 1200 200 1000  2000 500 1500 2500  /  /  / 
Male VMBO  650 950 2000 500 1500  2500 500 1800 3000  300 3000  5500 
Female HAVO  50 1000 1500 700 1500  2000 320 1400 2500  750  1900  5000 
Male HAVO  800 1050 1500  500 2000  3000 750 1800 3000 1000  2500  7000 
Female VWO  1500 2100  2700  / / /  500  1500  2500  600  1650  3000 
Male VWO  800 2200 5000  / / /  900  2000  2500  1000  2000  3500 
                      
B. Quantiles of expected earnings 10 years after graduation 
  
  
Stop Studying after current school  Proceeding to MBO  Proceeding to HBO  Proceeding to University 
    Empirical Quantile  Empirical Quantile  Empirical Quantile  Empirical Quantile 
Respondent 
Group  0.1 0.5  0.9  0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9 
Female VMBO  1000 1200  1800  450 1250  2500 788 2000 4000  /  /  / 
Male VMBO  650 1850 3000 1000 2000 4000  600  2200 10000 1000 2900 8000 
Female HAVO  300 1500 2500 1000 1550 3000  700  2000  4000  1340  2200  5000 
Male HAVO  1500 2250  3000  1000 3500 4000 1350  2500 6000 1400  4000  12000 
FemaleVWO  3500 4250  5000  / / /  850  2000  4000  1000  2500  5000 
Male VWO  3000 5000 10000  / / /  1300  2500  8000  1800  3200  7000 
Note: there are no observations of VMBO females respondents declaring the intention to proceed to University. It is not possible for VWO students to proceed 
towards MBO. In italics those cells for which the number of observations is less than 20  39
Table 7.  Gender wage gap, recorded and perceived 













 I  II  III  IV  V 
VMBO  0.33 0.158  -0.172    0.464  0.134 
HAVO  0.31 0.48  0.262  0.128  -0.182 
VWO  0.31 0.46  0.264  0.793  0.483 
MBO  0.183 0.243  0.06  0.371** 0.188 
HBO  -0.166 0.146  0.313  0.223** 0.389 
University  0.109 0.158  0.049  0.291** 0.182 













VMBO  0.393 0.351  -0.042  0.609  0.216 
HAVO  0.213 0.334  0.121  0.034  -0.179 
VWO  0.213 0.15  -0.63  0.403  0.190 
MBO  0.325 0.491  0.166  0.302** -0.023 
HBO  0.254 0.167  -0.087  0.403*** 0.149 
University  0.336 0.302  -0.034  0.399*** 0.063 
Note: */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%. CBS groups HAVO and VWO graduates in one 
category.  Column I is obtained from the ratio: ,, / Fc Mc WW   in the CBS data.  Column II is obtained from the 
ratio: ,, / Fc Mc WW  in our data. F and M indicate females and males respectively and c the educational category.   
 
 

















 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) (V) 
Females VMBO  0.843 0.500  -0.343  0.519** -0.324 
Females HAVO  1.204 0.500  -0.704  0.455  -0.749 
Females VWO  1.204 1.023  -0.181  0.670** -0.534 
Females MBO  0.224 0.120  -0.104  0.608*** 0.384 
Females HBO  0.194 0.363  0.169  0.573*** 0.379 
Females University  0.060 0.324  0.264  0.700*** 0.64 
Males VMBO  1.038 0.947  -0.091  0.099  -0.939 
Males HAVO  0.942 1.143  0.201  0.639** -0.303 
Males VWO  0.942 1.273  0.331  0.592  -0.35 
Males MBO  0.482 0.571  0.089  0.517*** 0.035 
Males HBO  0.920 0.286  -0.634  0.720*** -0.2 
Males University   0.424 0.347  -0.077  0.838*** 0.414 
Note: */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%. CBS groups HAVO and VWO graduates in one 
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 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female -0.414**  -0.279  -0.382** -0.264* 
 (0.133)  (0.150)  (0.123) (0.124) 
Age  0.091 0.002  -0.045  -0.073 
  (0.084) (0.112)  (0.091)  (0.074) 
Immigrant  0.272 0.274  0.276  0.148 
  (0.216) (0.198)  (0.152)  (0.235) 
0.002 0.059  -0.147  -0.143  Father's education 
low  (0.154) (0.171)  (0.189)  (0.143) 
-0.512**  -0.044  -0.405*  -0.269  Father's education 
medium  (0.190)  (0.209)  (0.159)  (0.163) 
-0.172 -0.329  -0.002  -0.146  Mother's education 
low  (0.231) (0.235)  (0.210)  (0.194) 
0.191 0.063  0.302*  0.171  Mother's education 
medium  (0.173) (0.207)  (0.143)  (0.153) 
Continue: MBO  -0.541 -0.711  -0.377  -0.595 
  (0.375) (0.500)  (0.268)  (0.320) 
Continue: HBO  -0.394 -0.455  0.008  -0.347 
  (0.383) (0.508)  (0.292)  (0.348) 
0.000 0.003  0.003  0.005  Probability to 
complete  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant 6.760***  7.453***  7.333***  7.927*** 
 (0.506)  (0.688)  (0.537)  (0.447) 
R2  0.091 0.041  0.089  0.063 
N  300 286  330  314 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance 
levels at 10%/5%/1%.Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, 
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 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female -0.239**  -0.306***  -0.246**  -0.460*** 
 (0.088)  (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.071) 
Age  -0.030 -0.036  0.058  0.010 
  (0.053) (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.048) 
0.125  0.292*  -0.081 0.144  Immigrant 
  (0.147)  (0.139)  (0.146) (0.104) 
0.172 -0.021  -0.073  0.022  Father's education 
low  (0.216) (0.113)  (0.123)  (0.167) 
-0.027 -0.001  -0.026  -0.112  Father's education 
medium  (0.104) (0.089)  (0.092)  (0.089) 
-0.047 0.129  0.125  -0.175  Mother's education 
low  (0.197) (0.115)  (0.131)  (0.136) 
0.118 0.111  0.073  0.156  Mother's education 
medium  (0.088) (0.080)  (0.078)  (0.082) 
-0.040 0.179  0.104  -0.093  Continue: HBO 
  (0.275) (0.301)  (0.276)  (0.284) 
Continue: University  -0.149 0.035  0.481  0.076 
  (0.340) (0.344)  (0.328)  (0.310) 
0.014 -0.004  -0.059  -0.094  Next-to-last year 
student  (0.100) (0.106)  (0.081)  (0.088) 
-0.001 -0.002  0.001  0.002  Probability to 
Complete  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant 7.055***  7.518***  6.869***  7.832*** 
 (0.365)  (0.365)  (0.361)  (0.336) 
R2  0.020 0.035  0.036  0.083 
N  693 670  742  717 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance 
levels at 10%/5%/1%. Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, 










   42
 















 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female -0.252**  -0.347***  -0.252***  -0.395*** 
 (0.083)  (0.089)  (0.076)  (0.080) 
Age  0.059  0.119*  0.047 0.018 
  (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.055) (0.052) 
Immigrant  0.086 0.064  0.101  0.086 
  (0.096) (0.088)  (0.071)  (0.083) 
0.266  0.377** 0.441**  0.211  Father's education 
low  (0.179)  (0.142) (0.162)  (0.147) 
0.189** 0.164* -0.017 -0.044  Father's education 
medium  (0.072) (0.068)  (0.071) (0.072) 
-0.032 -0.159  -0.132  -0.189  Mother's education 
low  (0.122) (0.149)  (0.133)  (0.167) 
0.051 0.113  0.121  0.008  Mother's education 
medium  (0.067) (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.070) 
-0.065 -0.048  -0.198** -0.178*  Not proceeding to 
University  (0.097) (0.103)  (0.076) (0.078) 
0.115 0.106  0.090  -0.009  Next-to-last year 
students  (0.096) (0.103)  (0.105)  (0.101) 
-0.007** -0.007** -0.001 -0.001  Probability of 
completion  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 7.025***  7.214***  7.296***  8.112*** 
 (0.440)  (0.460)  (0.432)  (0.431) 
R2  0.055 0.078  0.042  0.061 
N  578 568  613  592 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance 
levels at 10%/5%/1%. Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, 
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10 years after 
tertiary 
education 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female 0.109*  0.022  0.154*** 0.154*** 
 (0.047)  (0.057)  (0.036)  (0.036)    
Age  -0.003  -0.021  0.001  0.001    
  (0.036)  (0.042)  (0.024)  (0.024)    
Immigrant  -0.056  -0.076  -0.044  -0.044    
  (0.060)  (0.070)  (0.049)  (0.049)    
Father's education medium  -0.074  -0.081  -0.080  -0.080    
  (0.058)  (0.060)  (0.043)  (0.043)    
Father's education low  -0.007  -0.021  -0.077  -0.077    
  (0.082)  (0.085)  (0.059)  (0.059)    
Mother's education medium  0.076  0.051 0.058 0.058       
  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.041)  (0.041)    
Mother's education low  -0.081  -0.019  -0.056  -0.056    
  (0.098)  (0.103)  (0.079)  (0.079)    
Continue: MBO  -0.042 -0.154  -0.156*  -0.156*   
  (0.109) (0.111)  (0.067)  (0.067)    
Continue: HBO  0.018 -0.057  -0.193** -0.193**   
  (0.114) (0.156)  (0.074)  (0.074)    
Probability of completion  -0.001  0.000  -0.000  -0.000    
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)    
Constant 0.801**  0.932**  0.739***  0.739*** 
  (0.297)  (0.326) (0.165) (0.165)       
R2  0.036  0.017 0.083 0.083       
N  283  283 319 319 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.   
Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, mother’s education high, not 
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10 years after 
tertiary 
education 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female  -0.017 0.066  0.047*  0.013    
  (0.072) (0.044)  (0.023)  (0.026)    
Age  -0.045 -0.027  -0.026  -0.031*   
  (0.035) (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.015)    
Immigrant  -0.031  -0.053  0.018  0.023    
  (0.044)  (0.053)  (0.036)  (0.043)    
Father's education medium  -0.056 0.017 0.034 0.021       
  (0.074)  (0.107)  (0.028)  (0.032)    
Father's education low  -0.029  -0.079  0.032  0.025    
  (0.070)  (0.077)  (0.056)  (0.062)    
Mother's education medium  0.011  0.127 -0.033 0.008       
  (0.088)  (0.097)  (0.026)  (0.029)    
Mother's education low  -0.040 0.026  -0.123*  -0.015    
  (0.083) (0.083)  (0.057)  (0.075)    
Continue: HBO  0.051  0.082 -0.010 0.033       
  (0.071)  (0.087)  (0.059)  (0.064)    
Continue: University  0.038  0.104 0.031 0.093       
  (0.091)  (0.099)  (0.067)  (0.075)    
Penultimate year students  0.012  -0.026  0.040  0.013    
  (0.041)  (0.063)  (0.025)  (0.028)    
Probability of completion  -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000       
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)    
Constant 1.136**  0.511*  0.704***  0.716*** 
  (0.395)  (0.254) (0.132) (0.148)       
R2  0.010  0.011 0.034 0.019       
N  660  660 729 705 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.   
Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, mother’s education high, 
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10 years after 
tertiary 
education 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female 0.060*  0.060*  0.059*  0.029    
 (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.024)    
Age -0.037*  -0.041*  -0.035*  -0.051**   
  (0.018)  (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)       
Immigrant  0.066  0.086  0.088*  0.046    
  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.042)    
Father's education medium  0.062  0.031 0.025 0.056       
  (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.037)    
Father's education low  0.003  0.055  -0.113  -0.095    
  (0.095)  (0.084)  (0.062)  (0.071)    
Mother's education medium  -0.039  -0.036  -0.028  -0.022    
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.031)    
Mother's education low  -0.037  -0.017  0.044  0.123    
  (0.088)  (0.091)  (0.060)  (0.068)    
Not University  0.010  0.020 0.015 0.007       
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.029)    
Penultimate year students  0.059  0.024  0.022  -0.004    
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.031)    
Probability of completion  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001    
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    
Constant 0.774***  0.761***  0.830***  0.976*** 
  (0.163)  (0.159) (0.140) (0.151)       
R2  0.050  0.039 0.046 0.044       
N  569  569 608 595 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.   
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10 years after 
tertiary 
education 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female  -0.067 -0.056  -0.057* -0.057* 
  (0.046) (0.053)  (0.025) (0.025) 
Age  -0.001 0.032 0.019 0.019 
  (0.026) (0.035)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Immigrant  -0.064 0.025 0.025 0.025 
  (0.063) (0.070)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Father's education medium  -0.051 0.048 0.040 0.040 
  (0.049) (0.054)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Father's education low  -0.011 0.063 0.031 0.031 
  (0.081) (0.093)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Mother's education medium  0.026 -0.037  -0.048  -0.048 
  (0.050) (0.054)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Mother's education low  0.003 -0.036  -0.052  -0.052 
  (0.073) (0.080)  (0.053)  (0.053) 
Continue: MBO  -0.118 -0.034  -0.029  -0.029 
  (0.155) (0.097)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
Continue: HBO  -0.103 -0.109 0.018 0.018 
  (0.163) (0.137)  (0.072)  (0.072) 
Probability of completion  0.002 0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  0.041 -0.007  0.015 0.015 
  (0.236) (0.259)  (0.129)  (0.129) 
R2  0.027  0.017 0.048 0.048 
N  283  283 319 319 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.   
Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, mother’s education high, not 
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10 years after 
tertiary 
education 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female  0.057 -0.041  -0.030*  -0.030    
  (0.076) (0.032)  (0.015)  (0.023)    
Age  0.014  0.024 -0.004 0.008       
  (0.037)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.014)    
Immigrant  0.024  0.025  -0.008  -0.018    
  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.022)  (0.029)    
Father's education medium  -0.029  -0.038  -0.010  0.002    
  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.018)  (0.025)    
Father's education low  -0.070  -0.006  -0.013  -0.022    
  (0.074)  (0.053)  (0.029)  (0.050)    
Mother's education medium  0.127  -0.069  0.005  0.007    
  (0.080)  (0.042)  (0.017)  (0.026)    
Mother's education low  0.121 0.109  -0.012  0.135**  
  (0.075) (0.058)  (0.041)  (0.049)    
Continue: HBO  -0.074 -0.004  0.088**  0.069    
  (0.063) (0.062)  (0.034)  (0.049)    
Continue: University  -0.078 -0.014  0.100*  0.083    
  (0.087) (0.068)  (0.042)  (0.063)    
Penultimate year students  -0.037 0.051  -0.040*  -0.005    
  (0.040) (0.044)  (0.017)  (0.023)    
Probability of completion  0.002  -0.001  0.000  -0.000    
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)    
Constant  -0.196 0.083 0.009 0.060       
  (0.417)  (0.190)  (0.086)  (0.126)    
R2  0.013  0.013 0.029 0.015       
N  660  660 729 705 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.   
Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, mother’s education high, not 
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10 years after 
tertiary 
education 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Female  -0.043 0.023  -0.048**  -0.038    
  (0.027) (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.022)    
Age  0.016  0.008 0.005 0.007       
  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.014)    
Immigrant  -0.030  0.009  0.025  -0.002    
  (0.053)  (0.041)  (0.024)  (0.033)    
Father's education medium  0.008  0.005 -0.011 0.005       
  (0.036)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.029)    
Father's education low  -0.026 -0.023  -0.039  -0.216**  
  (0.080) (0.090)  (0.062)  (0.081)    
Mother's education medium  0.061*  0.015 -0.003 0.014       
  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.025)    
Mother's education low  0.069  -0.189**  0.075  0.034    
  (0.081)  (0.073)  (0.053)  (0.055)    
Not University  -0.021  -0.010  -0.016  0.043    
  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.025)    
Penultimate year students  0.025 -0.037  0.016  0.053*   
  (0.034) (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.024)    
Probability of completion  0.001 -0.000  0.001  0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    
Constant  -0.140  0.090  -0.023  -0.219    
  (0.181)  (0.149)  (0.091)  (0.136)    
R2  0.019  0.025 0.030 0.061       
N  569  569 608 595 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.   
Reference group: Male, Dutch, father’s education high, mother’s education high, university last 
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Table 18.  Descriptive statistics perceived returns to education by future 
destination 
         Quantiles  
Females  N Mean  S.D.  Min .25  .50 .75  Max 
Work  6 0.23  0.21  0.01  0.06  0.17  0.50  0.50 
MBO  154  0.16  0.23 -0.60 0.02 0.13  0.27  1.00 
HBO  507  0.13  0.17 -0.85 0.05 0.12  0.20  0.99 
University  343  0.23  0.19 -0.54 0.12 0.21  0.32  1.00 
Total   1010    0.17    0.19  -0.85  0.07  0.15  0.25  1.00 
Males            
Work  4 0.21  0.21  0.06  0.08  0.12  0.33  0.52 
MBO  74  0.19  0.23 -0.58 0.08 0.16  0.29  0.94 
HBO  192  0.13  0.15 -0.68 0.05 0.13  0.22  0.67 
University  155  0.21  0.17 -0.18 0.10 0.20  0.29  0.94 
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Table 19. Perceived returns to education 
  VMBO HAVO  VWO 
 I   II  III 
Female  -0.034  -0.004  0.013    
  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.015)    
Age  -0.012  0.008  -0.013    
  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.011)    
Immigrant  0.022  -0.019  -0.027    
  (0.046)  (0.026)  (0.021)    
Father's education low  -0.050  -0.044  0.010    
  (0.046)  (0.025)  (0.061)    
Father's education medium  -0.005 -0.025  -0.048*   
  (0.042) (0.022) (0.020)    
Mother's education low  0.114  -0.001  -0.001    
  (0.070)  (0.047)  (0.048)    
Mother's education medium  -0.013  -0.007  0.001    
  (0.041)  (0.021)  (0.020)    
Probability of completion  0.002**  0.001  0.002*   
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    
HBO  -0.125 -0.037               
  (0.084) (0.074)                 
MBO  -0.027                
  (0.081)                
University   -0.023              
   (0.077)              
Not proceeding to University    -0.110*** 
     (0.014)    
Penultimate year students  -0.026  -0.040*   
   (0.018)  (0.018)    
Constant  0.097  0.091  0.194*   
  (0.105)  (0.083)  (0.096)    
R2  0.081  0.028  0.099    
N  260 616 549 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicates significance levels at 10%/5%/1%.   
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Figure 1: Distribution of expected entry wages: males 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of expected entry wages: females 
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Note: we eliminated 5 observations for which the expected wage was equal to or exceeded 
15000 Euros per month. The inclusion of those outliers would have caused the clustering of 
most of our observations in the left tail of the distribution.  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of expected wages 10 years after entry: males 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of expected wages 10 years after entry: females 
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Wages  53
Note: we eliminated 75 observations for which the expected wage was equal to or exceeded 
20000 Euros per month. The inclusion of those outliers would have caused the clustering of 
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Distribution of skewness coeff. of entry wages: males
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Distribution of expected returns to education: males 
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Distribution of expected returns to education: females  59
 
Source: Wikipedia 